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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT 
TION, 
COPPEB COEPOEA-
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
— vs.— 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political sub-
division of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Intervenor and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 7639 
PETITION FOE EEHEAEING 
Comes now appellant and petitions the court for a 
rehearing herein for the following reasons : 
1. The majority has erred in failing to apply the 
provisions of Section 80-5-56, Utah Code Annotated. 
2. The court has erred in failing to apply as the 
alternative the provisions of Section 80-3-1 (5), Utah 
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Code Annotated, and instead has substituted its own con-
cept of value for tax purposes. 
C. C. PARSONS 
A. D.MOFFAT 
CALVIN A. BEHLE 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Plaintiff. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Having conceded Kennecott's point that there is no 
"market value" for appellant's tailings pond lands, this 
court was confronted with an election between the two 
applicable legislative mandates: (a) the assessment must 
be nominal under Section 80-3-1 (5); or (b) the $5.00 per 
acre rule for mines under Section 80-5-56 should be held 
to apply. 
The latter, which counsel still submits was intended 
to apply in such cases, was peremptorily dismissed on 
the authority of the Tenth Circuit opinion. Reference 
is made to appellant's brief on this point, to which we 
can add nothing further. 
However, rather than face the dilemma as would 
the District Judge, and logically grant the tax reduction 
as required by the only other applicable legislative man-
date, the majority appears to plunge into the realm of 
judicial legislation and speculation in order to sustain the 
tax. 
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a. It is said that should this land be condemned, 
its value to Kennecott would be more than nominal. This 
assumption cannot bear scrutiny, for ready reference to 
the law of condemnation confronts such reasoning with 
the elementary rule that if the fair market value of the 
land taken was nominal, such is the measure of the award. 
The majority opinion, it is respectfully submitted, con-
fuses the value of the land itself with the severance dam-
ages and consequential damages which would result if 
all or part of the tailings pond were to be taken under 
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 
b. Then it is said that since it would not be fair 
to Kennecott to condemn the land at nominal market 
value, the land must be valued to include the severance 
damage. But such damage as a part of the over-all re-
quirement of "just compensation" is entirely apart from 
the element of just compensation which is the value of 
the land taken. 
c. And in any event, on what basis would the 
majority justify the substitution for the legislative man-
date of "market value," its own concept of "just compen-
sation"? Certainly it should not be because of any argu-
ment that neither market value — here nominal, nor 
$5.00 per acre — likewise rejected, is proper for Kenne-
cott because of its "multi-million dollar business." Tax 
legislation of course applies to all taxpayers alike, but 
counsel respectfully submits that the result in this case 
is to apply to this taxpayer alone a standard other than 
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that prescribed by either of the legislative mandates cited 
above, the only two applicable statutes. 
d. Finally, we invite the court's attention to the 
following elementary principle as it was recently ex-
pressed in the Arizona case of State Tax Commission v. 
Miami Copper Co., 246 P. 2d 871, which here should be 
the guide: 
In this jurisdiction we are firmly committed 
to the doctrine that doubtful tax statutes should 
be given a strict construction against the taxing 
power, giving due regard to the expression of the 
legislative intent; and that the courts will not 
"strain, stretch and struggle " to uncover hidden 
taxable items,, See Alvord v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 69 Ariz. 287, 213 P. 2d 363. 
It is respectfully submitted that rather than to 
invoke this principle, the very reverse has here been ap-
plied to the taxpayer. 
We urge the court not to place its record of such 
action on the books until a rehearing has afforded it the 
opportunity to reconcile the law to the facts in this case. 
In a delay of nearly two years since oral argument it 
is suggested that the majority has made an unfortunate 
and transparent error which in justice should be cor-
rected when the matter is called to attention. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PARSONS 
A. D.MOFFAT 
CALVIN A. BEHLE 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Plaintiff. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
